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Nuclear Weapons and the Ecology: Is




The purpose of this article is to call attention to the ongoing damage
and threat to the ecology of the earth posed by the continued production
and deployment of nuclear weapons, to study trends in international and
domestic law addressing this serious problem, and to recommend a direc-
tion for further development of the law.
I. THE PROBLEM
August, 1990, marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the detonation by
the United States of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Ja-
pan. That single use opened the eyes of the world to a potential catastro-
phe more devastating than anything previously imagined, let alone em-
ployed to kill human beings. Despite partly successful efforts through
conventions to limit the testing' and spread2 of nuclear weapons, they
have nevertheless proliferated in size and numbers.' Also, an ever-increas-
* This article is an adapted version of an address given by Professor Ved Nanda at the
first IALANA World Conference held at the Hague, the Netherlands, on September 22-24,
1989.
** Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law; Director, International Legal Studies Pro-
gram, University of Denver College of Law.
*** J.D. Candidate, Spring 1991, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433
[hereinafter LTBT]; Threshold Test Ban Treaty, July 3, 1974, United States-Soviet Union,
preamble, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 906 (1974) (unratified), 12 U.N. DISARMAMENT
Y. B. 155-81 (1987); COMM'N ON INT'L SECURITY & ARMS CONTROL BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
187-223 (1985); B. LALL & P. BRANDES, BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS (1987); N. JOECK & H.
YORK, COUNTDOWN ON THE COMPREHENSIVE BAN (1986). But see Towell, Will Fear of Acci-
dental Blasts Torpedo Activists' Plans?, 48 CONG Q.W. REP. 1733 (June 2, 1990) (discussing
recent revelations about currently deployed U.S. warheads that were found to be unsafe).
2. See the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No.
6839 [hereinafter NPT]; Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71; Treaty of Tiatelolco (Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281; M. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979 11 (1980); U.N. ASS'N OF THE U.S., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: To-
WARD GLOBAL RESTRAINT (1984); Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, re-
printed in U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 631 (1984) (address by the Secretary of
State George P. Shultz to the United Nations Association of the United States, Nov. 1,
1984, emphasizing the U.S. policy of trying to prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons by
nations that do not already have them).
3. Over 50,000 nuclear weapons now exist throughout the world, amounting to an esti-
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ing number of countries not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1968 are thought to possess actual weapons or the capability to
produce them.' With thousands of nuclear bombs and missiles in exis-
tence, the possibility of an accidental detonation in a populated area5 or a
hostile use by one of the superpowers or another country can not be ruled
out.
Even if, arguendo, one were to accept the proposition that the manu-
facture and possession of nuclear weapons are not in violation of interna-
tional law,6 one cannot overstate the threat of these weapons; should nu-
clear weapons ever again be used by one country against another,
humanity and the world as we know it will be irrevocably altered, if not
completely destroyed.
7
mated total yield of some 15,000 megatons- about 5000 times greater than that of all the
explosives used in the Second World War. See Climatic and Other Global Effects of Nu-
clear War (Results of a United Nations General Assembly commissioned study), DISARMA-
MENT, Autumn 1988, at 141; Warner, Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Sci. &
PUB. POL'Y, Feb. 1989, at 53; C. CHANT & I. HOGG, NUCLEAR WAR IN THE 1980's? (1983).
4. Besides France and China, which have developed and tested nuclear weapons, the
known countries include India (whose only nuclear explosion took place underground),
Israel, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina and the Republic of
Korea. See Koplow & Schrag, Phasing Out Nuclear Weapons Tests, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L.
207, 209 (1989). The IAEA Bulletin periodically updates the list of NPT parties. See
SCHEINMAN, THE NONPROLIFERATION ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
(1985).
5. See THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR (A. Demchuck ed. 1987); Natvig, Nu-
clear Disarmament and Accidental Nuclear War, 20 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 219 (1989).
For an account of past accidents, see Gregory & Edwards, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence:
Nuclear Weapons Accidents 1950-1988, 20 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 3 (1989); Note, Liability
for Damage Caused by the Accidental Operation of a Strategic Defense Initiative System,
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 317 (1988).
6. Of course, the question of nuclear weapons' legality is itself an unsettled issue. All
too often - especially at the governmental level - they are simply assumed to be legal.
Since they were first developed, there has been little serious debate among the ruling elites
anywhere about this crucial issue. Moreover, general discussions of subjects such as the en-
vironmental effects of war often regard their use as outside the topic's scope. See, e.g., Scha-
fer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmen-
tal Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct are Permissible During
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L J. 285 (1989).
However, in assessing the legal constraints society can and should impose on the contin-
ued existence of nuclear weapons, one should not gloss over this important matter. Sound
arguments can and should be made that they are unacceptable, both morally or ethically,
see, e.g., O'Conner, Just Peace and Just War, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC COMMITTEE, JUSTICE
AND WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 99 (1983) [hereinafter AMERICAN CATHOLIC COMMITTEE], and
legally. See, e.g., LAWYERS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE (M. Cohen & M. Govin eds. 1988);
Green, Nuclear Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, 17 DEN. J. INT'L & POL'Y 1 (1988);
Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24
STAN. J. INT'L. L. 111 (1987); Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the "Paradox"
of Nuclear Deterrence, 80 Nw.U. L. REV. 1407 (1986); Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus
International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983); Goldblat, Nu-
clear War Cannot Be Conducted With Obedience to the Rules of International Law, 13
BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS 317 (1982).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON THE CLI-
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Unfortunately, the threat of nuclear weapons extends beyond acci-
dental or deliberate detonation. Our scientific ability to understand the
effects of these weapons is increasingly catching up with our ability to
build them. We now recognize that our environment - and thus our way
of life - is placed in jeopardy by their very existence. We must confront
ongoing hazards inherent in the production, deployment, transportation
and testing of nuclear warheads and their components; in addition, the
problem of processing, disposing of and storing radioactive and
nonradioactive wastes dramatically increases year by year.
Dangers related to the transportation and deployment of nuclear
arms are illustrated by accidents involving Soviet submarines, gravely
threatening the residents and environments of the Baltic and Arctic re-
gions, and the recent revelation of "lost" nuclear missiles from a U.S. de-
stroyer in the Pacific.'
Similarly, the transportation of nuclear weapons material places
workers and residents living near weapons facilities at grave health risks.
Recently, there was a massive federal criminal inquiry into allegations
that the U.S. Department of Energy and Rockwell International Com-
pany, former operator of the Rocky Flats Weapons facility near Denver,
had dumped hazardous wastes illegally and had lied to cover up viola-
tions.9 As of this writing, Rocky Flats remains shut down because of inad-
equate waste disposal arrangements.'0
A short time ago, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
filed a law suit against the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) demanding
that the Department remove the shroud of secrecy surrounding the U.S.
nuclear weapons program and prepare one comprehensive environmental
impact statement covering all DOE facilities. NRDC based its claims on
allegations that DOE had failed to fulfill its responsibilities under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act." The environmental group demanded
that DOE "give the public the big picture" concerning nuclear weapons
production, waste cleanups, and compliance with federal hazardous waste
laws. 2 NRDC had obtained information that over eighty percent of DOE
MATE: A REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS (1985); NUCLEAR WINTER, DETERRENCE AND THE PRE-
VENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR (P. Sederberg ed. 1986); 2 M. HARWELL & T. HUTCHINSON, ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR: ECOLOGICAL AND AGRICULTURAL EFFECTS
(1985); THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (J. London & G. White eds. 1984);
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MIL-
ITARY IMPACT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1980) [hereinafter MILITARY IMPACT].
8. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, at A20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1989, at A6, col. 6.
9. See, e.g., L.A. Times, June 28, 1989, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
10. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1990, at 26, col. 1.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
12. See Environmentalists File Suit Against DOE Seeking Comprehensive Impact
Statement, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, DAILY RPT., DER No. 123, June 28, 1989; Barber,
Lawmakers, Environmental Groups Seek Review of Weapons Plants, INSIDE ENERGY/ WITH
FEDERAL LANDS, Dec. 19, 1988, at 5. But see Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (the Supreme Court held that the Navy is not re-
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facilities were not in compliance with federal hazardous waste laws. Sev-
eral law suits are pending in four states - Washington, Colorado, Nevada
and Ohio - brought by workers and neighbors of nuclear weapons
plants. a The plaintiffs contend that because of released radioactivity
they have suffered physical injury, emotional distress and lowered prop-
erty values."'
It is clear that the events at the Rocky Flats plant were not an iso-
lated occurrence. Billions of gallons of radioactive wastes from production
of bomb-grade material have been dumped directly or indirectly into the
soil and groundwater of the United States. 5 Moreover, hundreds of nu-
clear waste disposal tanks have been leaking for years. 6 The bill for
cleaning up this waste could total over $100 billion.' 7 The recent report
that radioactivity in the Columbia River from the Hanford nuclear weap-
ons plant might have caused serious health risks to those who drank
water and ate fish from the river has renewed concern among Native
Americans, some of whom were permanent residents near Hanford and
others who, for several years, migrated to the river for a part of each year
to fish.'8
A potential catastrophe is also posed by the danger of concentrated
radioactive waste interacting with water and chemicals to form hydrogen
and organic vapors which could explode.'9 In the Ural Mountains region
of the Soviet Union, a total exclusion zone of about 1000 square kilome-
ters has existed since 1957, almost thirty years before the widely publi-
cized vast contamination and evacuation due to the Chernobyl nuclear
quired to prepare an EIS because national security precludes the Navy from disclosing
whether it has made such a proposal; thus a court does not have the information necessary
to require an EIS); Comment, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education
Project: Assessing the Environmental Impact of Nuclear Weapons Storage, 3 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 335 (1984) [hereinafter Weinberger].
13. See Schneider, Nuclear Weapons Plants Face Suits Around the U.S., N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
14. See id.
15. See Steele, Hanford: America's Nuclear Graveyard, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Oct. 1989, at 15; Davis, Congress Faces Major Decision on Nuclear-Weapons Reactors, 46
CONG Q. W. REP. 21 (Jan. 2, 1988); Alvarez & Makhijani, Hidden Legacy of the Arms Race:
Radioactive Waste, TECH. REV., Aug./Sept. 1988, at 42; Montange, Federal Nuclear Waste
Disposal Policy, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309 (1987); Cleaning up Nuclear Weapons Facilities
May Top $92 Billion, 12 INT'L ENV'T REV. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 11, 1989) [hereinafter $92 Billion];
Finamore, Regulating Hazardous and Mixed Waste at DOE Nuclear Weapons Facilities:
Reversing Decades of Environmental Neglect, 9 HARV ENVTL. L. REV. 83 (1985); U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, Department of Energy Acting to Control Hazardous Wastes at its Savan-
nah River Nuclear Facilities (Nov. 21, 1984) (GAO/RCED-85-23); Weinberger, supra, note
12.
16. See Alvarez & Malchijani, supra note 15, at 44-46.
17. See Alvarez & Makhijani, supra note 15, at 51; See also $92 Billion, supra note 15,
at 9 (putting the estimate at $92 million).
18. See Schneider, Nuclear Complex Threatens Indians, N.Y. Times, Sep. 3, 1990, at
CI, col. 1.
19. Id. at 47-48.
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reactor explosion.2 0 Radionuclide contamination sufficient to visibly affect
the genetic and biological processes of plants and animals has left the
entire area uninhabitable by humans. This catastrophe was the result of
the Kyshtyn accident in which nuclear waste from many years of nuclear
processing for military purposes was dispersed over an extensive area.21
An additional threat exists in the possibility of earthquakes. The nu-
clear power plant and disposal facility located on the Savannah River in
South Carolina lies only ninety miles from the location of the largest and
most destructive earthquake ever recorded in the eastern U.S. It occurred
in 1886 and measured eight (8.0) on the Richter scale. The earthquake
caused damage as far away as Chicago.2"
The concerns of non-nuclear nations to possible severe health risks
from nuclear testing were dramatically brought to light by Australia and
New Zealand when they sued the French in the Nuclear Test Cases.23
Those two countries sought a declaratory judgment that the "carrying out
of further atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the South Pacific Ocean is
not consistent with applicable rules of international law," '24 and asked for
a court order to halt such tests. The French argued that "in the absence
of ascertained damage attributable to its nuclear experiments, they did
not violate any rule of international law ... "25 Because France ceased
nuclear testing before the case reached the "merits" phase, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice considered the matter moot and declined to pass
on the merits of the case. However, the Court did order interim measures,
requesting France to "avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-
active fallout" on the territories of Australia and New Zealand.26
Non-nuclear nations are not the only victims of nuclear testing. This
fact is well demonstrated by the claims of various U.S. citizens and de-
pendents against their own government for exposure through testing in
the states of New York, Nevada and Utah and in the Bikini Atoll.27 As
early as 1969, Ernest J. Sternglass, a professor of radiation physics at the
University of Pittsburgh Medical School, reported that there was a direct
correlation between the number of excess fetal deaths as a part of live
births and the amount of fallout deposits over New York state.2"
Thus, even a cursory glance at these pressing issues reveals two sim-
ple yet important observations. First, the problem of nuclear pollution is
20. On Chernobyl, see infra, notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
21. See Z. MEDVEDEV, NUCLEAR DISASTER IN THE URALS (1979). See also Trabtka,
Eyman & Auerbach, Analysis of the 1957-1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident, 209 ScI. 345
(1980).
22. Alvarez & Malchijani, supra note 15, at 47-48.
23. Australia v. France [1973] I.C.J. 99, 135.
24. Id. at 100.
25. Id. at 105.
26. Id. at 106, 142.
27. See, e.g., P. FRADKIN, FALLOUT - AN AMERICAN NUCLEAR TRAGEDY (1989).
28. Sternglass, Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Apr.
1969, at 18.
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global in nature. Consequently, there is a definite need to address the
ecological risks from a similar perspective. Secondly, these risks are inher-
ent in nuclear technology, whether employed for peaceful or nonpeaceful
purposes.2 9 In this respect, the nuclear accidents that have exposed the
world to the danger of nuclear radiation, as at Three-Mile Island and
Chernobyl, can be viewed as a barometer of the hazards present at pro-
duction facilities in nuclear arsenals or in nuclear-powered submarines,
satellites, etc.
Precise standards for controlling polluting activities at the interna-
tional level are currently lacking, particularly in the context of environ-
mental liability; indeed, in many instances, the same holds true even
within countries. Practically speaking, despite increasing recognition of
the many problems and their global dimensions, the various international
agreements and declarations do not elucidate an international consensus
on the issue of liability for transboundary harm.
Yet international law does contain evidence of rules that, if applied,
would impose liability on an offending state for transboundary ecological
damage. The traditional legal principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, that a "state may not legitimately permit its territory to be used
in ways directly injurious to another state," characterizes this claim."
This maxim has been adopted in several resolutions and declarations, in-
cluding the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment," as
well as important decisions of international tribunals. These include the
29. See, e.g., Miatello, International Responsibility for the use of Nuclear Energy, in
UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 287 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds.
1987); Curlee, Regulation of Radiation and Radioactive Materials, 31 A.F. L. REV. 69
(1989); Handl, Transboundary Nuclear Accidents: The Post-Chernobyl Multilateral Legis-
lative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L. Q. 203 (1988); Levy, International Law and the Chernobyl
Accident: Reflections on an Important But Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REV. 81 (1987);
Finamore, supra note 15; Note, Compensating Damage Arising from Global Nuclear Acci-
dents: The Chernobyl Situation, 10 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 197 (1988) [hereinafter
Compensating Damage]; Note, After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647 (1987) [hereinafter After Chernobyl].
30. See Caldwell, Concepts in Development of International Environmental Practice,
in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12, 22 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974); Levy, supra
note 29, at 99-100.
31. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, in Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/14 at 2-65 and Corr. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972). See also General Assembly Resolution 2996 (XXVII) of Dec. 15,
1972 which confirms the legal significance of Principle 21, 14 U.N. GAOR A/8730 at 278,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF 4816 (1972). As early as 1961, by Resolution 1629 (XVI), the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly declared:
The fundamental principles of international law impose a responsibility on all
states concerning actions which might have harmful biological consequences
for the existing and future generations of peoples of other states, by increasing
the levels of radioactive fallout.
16 U.N. GAOR (1043 Plenary Meeting) at 505-7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1043 (1961). The resolu-
tion was passed by a vote of 74 in favor, 0 against and 17 abstentions.
VOL. 19:1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ECOLOGY
Trail Smelter Arbitration32 between the United States and Canada which
explicitly recognized the principle of state responsibility for trans-
boundary environmental damage:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of seri-
ous consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence."3
Many writers have accepted this formulation as a rule of customary inter-
national law." '
Additionally, although it did not involve environmental harm, the In-
ternational Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in the Corfu Channel (U.K.
v. Albania.) case 5 is cited by scholars in support of holding states liable
for damages caused by transboundary pollution. 6 The ICJ in Corfu
Channel held Albania liable for damage to British warships and loss of
life caused by mines located in Albanian waters. In the words of the
Court, liability was founded "on certain general and well recognized prin-
ciples, namely ... every State's obligation not to allow, knowingly, its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."3 "
From an ecological perspective, the use of nuclear material magnifies
the threat of uncompensated harm as well as the lack of a definite solu-
tion. As Professor Jenks stated relatively early,
the potential hazards of nuclear accidents and contamination are so
much more dramatic than the hazards of aviation and the older forms
of pollution that they have given a new impetus to international ac-
tion concerning ultra-hazardous liability.
38
The need remains especially urgent to further develop and apply le-
gal principles to the threat of transboundary radioactive pollution. Na-
32. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. INT'L ARE. AWARDS 1911 (1938); 3
R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1938 (1941).
33. 3 R. INT'L ARE. AWARDS 1938, 1965 (1941).
34. See,e.g., Sands, Introduction - Transboundary Nuclear Pollution: International
Legal Issues, in CHERNOBY LAW AND COMMUNICATION 1, 11 (P. Sands ed. 1988) [hereinafter
LAW AND COMMUNICATION]; Kirgis, Technological Challenge of the Shared Environment:
U.S. Practice, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1974).
35. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. 4. Indeed, these
same decisions arguably support the position that strict liability should be the applicable
standard of care. See infra, notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 133 (1983); J. BARROS
& D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 69 (1974) [hereinafter Barros]; Gol-
die, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
283, 306 (1970).
37. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. at 22.
38. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL
DES COURS 106 (1966), quoted in Silva, Pending Problems on International Law of the En-
vironment, in ACADAMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 217, 222 (R. Dupuy ed. 1984).
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tions and legal scholars must strive to objectively define specific, accept-
able limits within which countries may legally conduct their nuclear
production programs, whether for peaceful purposes or - until such time
as it is held illegal under international law - for the manufacture of
weapons. This initiative must be conducted at both the domestic and in-
ternational levels. In so doing, states must arrive at a collective under-
standing of what standard liability can most fairly be apportioned in the
event of a nuclear accident involving transboundary ecological damage. It
is the position of this paper that such liability must be imposed on a
strict basis without regard to fault or circumstances, and that producing
states must be responsible for insuring that victims receive compensation.
To date, governments of both developing3 and developed countries
have resisted attempts to establish strict or absolute liability as a formal
concept of state responsibility. This is due in part to the fact that, politi-
cally, the very issue of liability is an extremely sensitive subject. Sover-
eign states traditionally object to the idea of assigning liability without
precisely determining fault. To the political realist participating in inter-
national relations, accepting strict liability as a standard of compensation
implies foregoing legal control over vital economic activities within the
country's respective territory. Attesting to this continuing political quan-
dary is the lack of substantive progress thus far on the part of the United
Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in its work on "interna-
tional liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohib-
ited by international law."'41 Moreover, the secrecy inherent in the mili-
tary context of nuclear weapons only complicates the matter further.
Another reason offered against making strict liability the standard
for compensation has been the practical difficulties foreseen in fairly as-
sessing causation and economic costs, including mitigation and reparation
efforts by victims following a nuclear accident."2 The recent tragedy at
39. On the attitudes of developing countries, see Biswas, Environment and Law: A
Perspective From Developing Countries, in id. at 389.
40. Both "strict" and "absolute" can be used to indicate a "no-fault" liability standard.
"Absolute liability" is often used to indicate a standard for which there can be no defenses,
whereas "strict liability" permits such defenses or qualifications. See, e.g., Goldie, Develop-
ment of an International Environmental Law, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENT 104, 133-34 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972). Herein, no distinction is made between the two
chiefly because that is the practice followed in many multilateral treaties purporting to es-
tablish a standard of care for transboundary harm from pollution. See, e.g., Paris Conven-
tion on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, art. 1, 956
U.N.T.S. 251, discussed infra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
41. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Ninth
Session, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 89, U.N.Doc. A/42/10 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
ILC Report]; Mcgraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study
of "International Liability," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986). See also infra notes 117-34 and
accompanying text.
42. See Handl, supra note 29, at 242-47; Pelzer, Current Problems of Nuclear Liability
Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period: A German Standpoint, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 66 (1987).
VOL. 19:1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ECOLOGY
Chernobyl underscored and, in a negative sense, validated this assertion. 43
The responsible government, the Soviet Union, refused to pay compensa-
tion for transboundary radiation injuries, arguing there was no legal basis
for imposing liability.
4 4
The argument has been made45 that in fact international law does
provide the basis for holding states strictly liable in this situation based
on the principles of such cases as the Trail Smelter Arbitration,6 the
Corfu Channel case,47 and others such as the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.
4 s
Whether a court would hold this to be the case cannot be said. However,
as the development of technology and the interdependence of the world
expands, nations are increasingly forced to confront the consequences of
other nations' actions.' 9 The time is perhaps drawing near when interna-
tional law will formally adopt a concept of true state responsibility.
II. NUCLEAR POLLUTION - INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
Pollution is an international problem. Increasingly, it demands atten-
tion at an international level. However, although it is developing rap-
idly,5" the law of international environmental regulation is a relatively
young field. Such is indeed the case with the regulation of nuclear pollu-
tion. Not until recently did widespread appreciation develop for the "in-
trinsically international" dimension of the hazards associated with nu-
clear power operations.5 Work had long been underway at the United
Nations and within regional organizations to institute standards and to
provide a coherent regulatory framework for the safe operation of na-
tional nuclear power installations. But unfortunately, it was not until the
1986 nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union52 that
43. On Chernobyl, see infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 29, at 223 and authorities cited; Pincus, Chernobyl is
Focus of IAEA Session; Political Maneuvering May Threaten Environmental Moves,
Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1986, at A22, col. 1.
45. See, e.g., J. SCHEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARD AN IN-
TERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 168-71 (1979); Handl, The Environment:
International Rights and Responsibilities, 74 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 223 (1980); Goldie,
supra note 36, at 306.
46. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. INr'L ARB. AWARDS 1911 (1938); 3 R. INT'L ARB.
AWARDS 1938 (1941).
47. Corfu Channel Case [1949] I.C.J. at 4.
48. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 281 (1957).
49. See Barnes, The Growing International Dimension to Environmental Issues, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 389 (1988) (Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency emphasizing global interdependence).
50. See, e.g., Nanda, Trends in International Environmental Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.
J. 187 (1990); Nanda, The Establishment of International Standards for Transnational
Environmental Injury, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1089 (1975) [hereinafter International Standards].
51. See Handl, supra note 29, at 203.
52. For examples of the vast literature already available on the Chernobyl incident, see
Z. MEDVEDEV, THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL (1990); Handl, supra note 29; Levy, supra note 29;
Compensating Damage, supra note 29; After Chernobyl, supra note 29; Chaze, Chernobyl's
Fiery Story Emerges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 1986, at 23; Trafford & Wellborn,
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the international community truly recognized just how easily an uninten-
tional release of radiation could have a dramatic physical impact on much
of the rest of the world. Almost immediately, governments began a con-
certed effort to determine, first, how the use of nuclear material could be
made safer in order to avoid accidental transboundary harm and, second,
how to assure if possible that when accidents do occur in the future, those
outside countries suffering harm are compensated. Following Chernobyl,
in the words of one analyst, "[pleople the world over realized that na-
tional boundaries are chimerical in an age of nuclear power production.
'5 3
A. Chernobyl and Its Ecological Impact
On April 26, 1986, a runaway chain-reaction of uranium-235 occurred
in reactor number four at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Soviet
Union. This caused what, in effect, was a slow nuclear explosion so power-
ful that it destroyed the reactor instantly, blowing its roof off and emit-
ting a cloud of lethal, radioactive contaminants." Within thirty-six hours,
more than 100,000 people had been evacuated from a radius of some
twenty miles around the reactor, 55 and eventually over 130,000 people in
the USSR had to be relocated.5 6 The direct, physical effects of the explo-
sion began spreading immediately. Two workers died instantly and over
30 others died in the following weeks. The hot debris of the Chernobyl
reactor covered an area of more than 5000 square kilometers with nearly
twenty million radionuclides, "making human life impossible. ' '57 The
cloud of radioactive residue spread over much of the northern hemi-
sphere, creating areas of serious radioactive contamination in Sweden,
Germany, Northern Italy, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece and many
other countries.5
Although the only people held openly responsible for the accident in
the Soviet Union were local plant officials and engineers, the onus of re-
sponsibility must in reality rest upon the Soviet government. Operators at
the plant did indeed make mistakes, but accounts of the accident and
Stark Fallout from Chernobyl, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., May 12, 1986, at 20.
53. Handl, supra note 29, at 203. The two nuclear reactor accidents that received wide-
spread publicity prior to Chernobyl occurred at the Windscale nuclear power plant in the
United Kingdom in October, 1957, and at the Three Mile Island plant in the U.S. in March,
1979, both of which released small amounts of radiation. See Highton, The Legal Aspects of
the Development of Atomic Energy in the United Kingdom, 12 VAND. L. REv. 223 (1958); S.
AVIEL, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 75-112 (1982). According to one author, more than
10,000 reactor accidents have occurred in the rest of the world since 1942, but Chernobyl
was only "the first nuclear accident in the Soviet Union that Soviet officials eventually re-
ported to the rest of the world." Medvedev, supra note 52, at x.
54. See Ukrainian Nuclear Fire Spreads Wide Tragedy With Radioactive Cloud, Wall
St. J., Apr. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter Ukrainian Nuclear Fire].
55. Sands, supra note 34, at 2.
56. Medvedev, supra note 52, at 75.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. See also Anspaugh, Catlin & Golfman, The Global Impact of the Chernobyl
Reactor Accident, 242 Sci. 1513 (1988).
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events leading up to it reveal basic design flaws in the reactor and appar-
ent negligence and inefficiencies at the highest government levels. 5 An
investigation of the accident by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) s° which concluded with a conference in Vienna in August, 1986,
pointed to the fact that on the night of the explosion a test of the reac-
tor's turbogenerators was being performed by inexperienced and incom-
petent technicians. The timing of the tests combined with the critical de-
sign flaws of that type of Soviet reactor (now discontinued) "exacerbated
the errors made by the operators and transformed a serious accident into
a disaster.""1
The Soviet government also failed its obvious responsibility to report
the occurrence to surrounding countries and the international media in
the hours and days immediately following the accident. In the beginning,
the Soviets were completely silent regarding the incident. Only satellite
photos6 2 and, as soon as one day later, significant increases in radioactiv-
ity levels in Denmark, Finland and Poland told the world what had hap-
pened.6 3 Not until some seventy-two hours later did the Soviet represen-
tative to the IAEA officially inform the IAEA's director that the accident
had occurred. 4 Thereafter, upon realizing the international and political
consequences attached to the accident and the attempted cover-up as
well as its own responsibility, the USSR began making information widely
available on its clean-up activities and the radiation levels at and near the
Chernobyl site.
6 5
The Chernobyl accident resulted in billions of dollars in economic
damages to human beings and the ecology in both the Soviet Union and
59. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 52, at 20-26, citing INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AD-
VISORY GROUP (INSAG), SUMMARY REPORT ON THE POST-ACCIDENT REVIEW MEETING ON THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1-
STI/PUB/740 (1987). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 2; and Sands, supra note
34, at 4.
60. The IAEA is an international organization established as part of the United Na-
tions in 1957 to promote and provide regulatory standards for the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. The agency also provides institutional guidance in arms reduction and the control of
nuclear proliferation. See, e.g., P. SzAsz, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1970). Its membership consists of industrialized and developing
countries as well as countries with centralized economies. See Reyners & Lellouche, Regula-
tion and Control by International Organizations in the Context of a Nuclear Accident:
The International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, in Nu-
CLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL 1 (P. Cameron, L. Hancher & W. Kuhn eds. 1988)
[hereinafter LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL]. See discussion, infra notes 128-140.
61. Medvedev, supra note 52, at 20.
62. See Ukrainian Nuclear Fire, supra note 54, at 24.
63. See Salo, Information Exchange After Chernobyl, 28 IAEA BULL. 18 (1986). Subse-
quently, increased radiation levels were observed, inter alia, in Austria, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia (April 29), France (May 1), Belgium, Greece,
Netherlands, United Kingdom (May 2), and Iceland (May 7). Low-level increases were also
detected in Japan and the United States. Sands, supra note 34, at 1.
64. Sands, supra note 34, at 1.
65. Id. at 3-4.
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far beyond. From 1986 to 1989, 9.2 billion rubles ($15.4 billion at the offi-
cial exchange rate) were spent cleaning up.66 The Soviet parliament re-
cently appropriated 16 billion rubles to continue the work and to address
medical emergency needs, and the republic Byelorussia is asking for an-
other 17 billion rubles to rehouse displaced residents and continue clean-
ing up.
67
Moreover, the ecological impact of Chernobyl is unequaled in size or
scale, excluding only perhaps the bombed Japanese cities of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima. Pine trees surrounding the station died within a few days; 400
hectares of pine forest died in all. Leafy trees such as birch and oak only
survived the first year.69 As a result of the disaster, approximately 130,000
people had to be permanently resettled, along with the Soviet-docu-
mented, intensive decontamination of more than 780 "population cen-
ters," usually villages and small towns throughout 1986 and 1987.9 It was
necessary to create an extensive fenced exclusion zone which included
5000 square kilometers of land considered heavily contaminated." Be-
sides this exclusion zone, the Soviet government undertook a large-scale
decontamination program which included removal of vast amounts of
topsoil, the destruction of forests and bushland, and the construction of
dams to ensure the hydrological isolation of the most contaminated ar-
eas. 7 ' Regarding the earth's natural ecological dispersion capacity, one So-
viet academician was quoted as stating:
In nature there is a mighty process of dilution and dispersion of ra-
dionuclides and this saved us .... I am referring to the trees, earth
and the water of the Kiev reservoir which received and absorbed the
main ejection of radioactivity. How many times have we cursed the
Kiev reservoir ... in this situation, however, it turned out to be very
useful, absorbing part of the radionuclides in its silt which then set-
tled on the bottom of the lake .... [W]e hope that ... dilution of the
radionuclides to an insignificant concentration will take place.
72
The entire extent of Chernobyl's ecological impact will not be known
for years, if ever; but its ramifications for the international legal commu-
nity have already begun to be apparent.
B. The Legal Implications of Chernobyl
Chernobyl revealed a world unprepared for a nuclear disaster. As
noted above, the extent of transboundary effects exceeded virtually all
previous predictions. The Soviet government has refused to compensate
66. Worrel, Chernobyl Still a Tragedy - and a Living Laboratory, Christ. Sci. Mon.,
July 24, 1990, at 10-11.
67. Id.
68. Medvedev, supra note 52, at 89.
69. Id. at 91.
70. Id. at 81-82.
71. Id. at 89-103.
72. Id. at 95.
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injured parties outside its own national borders, contending that no inter-
national mechanism exists for determining liability for nuclear accidents.
As the world community reacted to the Soviet accident, several questions
related to these issues immediately arose. First, are states obligated under
international law to prevent transboundary nuclear releases? If so, what
standard of care must states adhere to in order to avoid a nuclear acci-
dent? And, if an obligation does exist and an accident occurs causing
transboundary harm, is the state liable to make reparations for such dam-
age, and to what extent?
Contrary to the Soviet government's assertion, a sound argument can
be made to the effect that once the Chernobyl accident occurred, the So-
viets were liable under general principles of international law to compen-
sate injured victims."3 However, prior to Chernobyl (as well as other nu-
clear mishaps) no comprehensive and binding legal procedure existed
under international law to govern states' use and misuse of nuclear power.
What was lacking, and remains lacking today, is a multilateral treaty cod-
ifying customary international law and imposing liability directly on
states for nuclear accidents causing damage outside their individual
boundaries. Without such a direct, affirmative statement of law to which
the Soviet Union is a party, it is extremely unlikely that they will ever
agree to compensate other states for the damage cause by Chernobyl.7 '
Several multilateral conventions do address the issue of liability. These
include the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy 5 and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Damage.76 However, the U.S.S.R. is not a party to either," and both
73. The evidence in favor of this assertion is certainly not conclusive. However, many
scholars point to the significant number of incidents in which compensation has been made
for transboundary pollution damage, including that caused by nuclear weapons testing. One
such instance was the United States payment to Japan for damage caused by U.S. weapons
testing in the Pacific. Agreement on Personal and Property Damage Claims, Jan. 4, 1955,
United States-Japan, 6 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 3160. Although the U.S. did not admit liabil-
ity, payment of compensation does help create the expectation that a state is responsible for
such conduct if it results in injury or environmental damage. See Margolis, The Hydrogen
Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629, 637-39 (1955); see generally
International Standards, supra note 50, at 1093-1101. Moreover, as discussed, many have
interpreted judicial and arbitral decisions and international declarations as recognizing the
obligation to refrain from transboundary harm and to make appropriate reparation under
general principles of legal responsibility, supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
Sands, supra note 34, at 11-15; Handl, supra note 29; Springer, supra note 36, at 130-140;
Kirgis, supra note 34; Barros, supra note 36, at 68-70.
74. The Soviet Union has traditionally reserved the right not to recognize particular
customary norms offered as international law. See Levy, supra note 29, at 87-88.
75. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jul. 29,
1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (1974) (entered into force April 1, 1968) [hereinafter Paris Conven-
tion], reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). See discussion infra notes 150-161.
76. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265 (1985) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], reprinted in LAW AND COMMUNICA-
TION, supra note 34, at 96. See infra notes 150-161.
77. The Soviet Union is a party to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
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create liability only for operators of nuclear plants and not states.7" Com-
bined with the relatively limited number of international agreements con-
cerning transboundary air pollution in general and the current lack of a
definite consensus as to the proper standard of state liability, these cir-
cumstances caution against seriously arguing that the U.S.S.R. is obli-
gated to compensate the many victims of Chernobyl.
However, this fact only strengthens the argument that a formal, mul-
tilateral agreement is desparately needed that could be accepted. by all of
the world's nuclear weapons producing states as well as those employing
nuclear energy.
The world community's swift response to the legal implications of
Chernobyl is at least a positive sign in this direction. The Soviet govern-
ment has itself acted to improve the situation. While still not admitting
that the accident was due to design or operation flaws, it has instituted
measures to improve the safety of reactors similar to those at Chernobyl,
in addition to the assistance provided toward gathering important infor-
mation on the global effects of the tragedy.79 Also the USSR recently put
forward a proposal entitled the Proposed Programme for Establishing an
International Regime for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy."0
Therein, the Soviets proposed establishing a comprehensive international
regime for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.8" They explicitly recog-
nized the importance of the question of liability to the establishment of
such a regime, and they suggested that a possible multilateral interna-
tional legal instrument could be drawn up to deal with this issue. 2 Spe-
cifically, the proposal states:
The question of liability for nuclear damage occupies an important
place in activities relating to the international regulation of various
aspects of nuclear power safety .... A possible multilateral interna-
tional legal instrument could envisage the liability of States for inter-
national damage in terms of the transboundary effects of nuclear acci-
dents, as well as for material, moral and political damage caused by
unwarranted action taken under the pretext of protection against the
consequences of nuclear accidents (the spreading of untrue informa-
tion, introduction of unjustified restrictive measures, etc.).
83
The conclusion to this statement can be taken as an express indicator of
Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, " U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1442 (1979); however this agreement does not obligate states to compensate for injuries re-
sulting from transboundary pollution.
78. By providing only for private operator liability, these treaties exclude states from
responsibility and permit only relatively limited monetary compenasation. For a brief dis-
cussion of these limitations, see infra notes 150-161.
79. See Sands, supra note 34, at 4.
80. IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.1)/8, reprinted in LAW AND COMMUNICATION, supra, note 34, at
227.
81. Id. at 230.
82. Id. at 232-33.
83. Id.
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the difficulty involved in assigning fault following an accident such as
Chernobyl. While the Soviets are willing to admit the need to allocate
liability prior to a nuclear accident, they refuse to accept full accountabil-
ity for the damages claimed as a result of Chernobyl. 8 4 Nor, realistically,
could any more be expected of any other country.
Also important are two conventions resulting directly from the after-
math of Chernobyl. Derived from a proposal by the IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors convened shortly after the accident, 8 the Vienna Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident" and the Vienna Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency,8 7 focus on mitigating the effects of nuclear accidents. Both were
adopted in 1986 and soon entered into force. While the conventions do
not resolve every issue, their rapid adoption emphasizes the international
community's immediate recognition of the seriousness of Chernobyl and
of the need for unified global attention to the risks posed by trans-
boundary nuclear incidents.8 8
III. NUCLEAR POLLUTION - U.S. DOMESTIC REGULATION
The United States employs a complex regulatory system for control-
ling the various aspects of nuclear production. The primary mechanism
for regulating radioactive materials and radiation in this country is the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended,89 and its complimentary
regulatory program. The AEA regulatory structure includes the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) which regulates specified materials and
persons. The Department of Energy is in charge of the production of nu-
clear fuel and reactor-produced isotopes, the promotion of nuclear energy,
and the production of nuclear weapons. The NRC promulgates regula-
tions governing the possession, storage, use and manufacture of nuclear
84. In fact, the Soviets are said to favor "establishing a new convention on State liabil-
ity under public international law." Pelzer, Concepts of Nuclear Liability Revisited: A Post-
Chernobyl Assessment of the Paris and the Vienna Conventions, in LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL,
supra note 60, at 97, 114.
85. See Statement Summarizing Decisions Taken at the Special Session of the Board of
Governors Concerning the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, May 22, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1009
(1986).
86. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.1)/2.
Annex II, [hereinafter Early Notification Convention], reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986)
and LAW AND COMMUNICATION, supra note 34, at 236.
87. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency, IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.1)/2, Annex III [hereinafter Assistance Convention], reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986) and LAW AND COMMUNICATION, supra note 34, at 262
88. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2096 (1982). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 remains the basis
for the current statutory law regarding the majority of regulated nuclear energy and radio-
activity issues. See Curlee, supra note 29, at 76-78. The 1954 Act replaced the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-555, 60 Stat. 755. See id. at 76; see also S. REP. No. 1699,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3456-59.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
materials and devices that contain these materials.00
DOE and its predecessor agencies formerly received -authority from
the Atomic Energy Act and subsequent agency statutes9' for managing
the government nuclear program's hazardous waste and hazardous waste
mixed with radioactive materials as well as purely radioactive materials.
92
These Acts, however, provided no practical guidelines or standards for
waste disposal. Thus, for more than forty years, DOE and its predecessor
agencies have been generating millions of gallons of hazardous waste and
mixed waste with little or no real regulatory control.9"
In 1976, the United States passed the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA),"4 this country's most comprehensive federal hazard-
ous waste law to date. RCRA specifically applies to federal facilities. Sec-
tion 6001 of the Act apparently waives sovereign immunity, subjecting
federal facilities to state and local requirements for hazardous and mixed
waste management. 95 Yet even though RCRA requires federal agencies to
comply with all federal, state, regional and local requirements respecting
hazardous and mixed waste disposal,96 "[slince 1976, DOE has continually
attempted to avoid full compliance with" the Act.
97
This outline of the U.S. experience is far from complete. It does indi-
cate the difficulty involved in trying to effectively regulate the production
and disposition of nuclear weapons and their byproducts - a difficulty
that is only compounded by the reluctance of governmental agencies such
as the DOE to comply with broader interpretations of domestic legisla-
tion. But recent developments in United States law such as RCRA reflect
an enhanced public and Congressional sensitivity to environmental condi-
tions. With respect to regulation of the nuclear weapons industry, this
increased concern translates into demands that more rigorous controls be
applied and that they be strictly enforced. The call is often raised in this
country that the known and suspected environmental hazards of nuclear
weapons and the arms race require that further production, testing and
deployment cease altogether, or that there at least be serious unilateral
90. See Curlee, supra note 29, at 76.
91. See The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1982); Depart-
ment of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (Aug. 4, 1977) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 and scattered sections in 3, 5, 7, 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (1982)).
92. The disposal of "high-level radioactive waste" is legislatively controlled by the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1982); see Davenport,
The Law of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REV. 481(1986). The NWPA does not
apply to DOE high-level waste, unless that waste is disposed of in a repository containing
commercial waste. 42 U.S.C. § 10107(b) & (c). See Montange, supra note 15, at 377-80.
93. See Finamore, supra note 15; Curlee, supra note 29; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found.
(LEAF) v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (the court held that DOE was not
exempt from RCRA coverage).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
95. See Finamore, supra note 15, at 92.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982).
97. Finamore, supra note 15, at 86.
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cuts. Whether such demands will prove in any way successful remains to
be seen. As superpower tensions continue to ease, the promise grows more
favorable that either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. or both will take just such a
step.
What this review of recent U.S. developments also indicates is that
perhaps the most practical approach to nuclear waste is to design similar
legislation and rules applicable to both nuclear weapons production and
to the broader field of nuclear energy. Indeed, it would hardly seem desir-
able to do otherwise. Although domestic regulation does distinguish be-
tween the two for military purposes and private, commercial purposes,
the environmental goals sought to be achieved are virtually identical. Ob-
viously, both produce similar waste materials. Both have been developed
simultaneously, and both pose equally dangerous production and trans-
portation hazards. The approach under international law is substantially
the same.
IV. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A considerable portion of the international community continues to
oppose nuclear weapons." However, as long as nuclear nations continue
to perceive them as a deterrent to attack (as well as a retaliation), their
legal status under international law will remain an issue of conceptual
discussion at best.99
But this fact has not deterred the United Nations and the interna-
tional community from attempting to codify a recognized body of law to
prevent nuclear accidents and to assure some degree of compensation for
transboundary injuries in the event an accident occurs. Indeed, as noted
above, this effort has recently gained in interest and impetus.
Formal international regulation of the environmental effects of nu-
clear weapons, like domestic legislation in the U.S., is intricately tied to
the regulation of the use of nuclear energy generally. Radiation from any
source easily defies national borders. Especially in the wake of Chernobyl,
98. For example, in 1986 the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 132 to 17 (Western
countries), with 4 abstentions, reaffirmed its position "that the use of nuclear weapons
would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as
declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 124 December 1978,
34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December
1981 .... " G.A. Res. 41/60 F, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Supp. 53) at 85 (1986), reprinted in 11
U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 134-35 (1986).
For a background of nuclear opposition, see COMM'N ON INT'L SECURITY & ARMS CON-
TROL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (1985).
See generally AMERICAN CATHOLIC COMMITTEE, supra note 6.
99. Compare id. with, e.g., Almond, Nuclear Weapons Are Legal Tools, BULL ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, May, 1985, at 32 (as long as no treaty exists banning nuclear weapons, they are
not illegal); DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE art. 35 (1956) (there
is no customary rule of international law or convention banning them); DEPT. OF THE AIR
FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERA-
TIONS 5 (1976).
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international lawyers and policy makers alike recognize that the peaceful
production of nuclear power by one sovereign state - if carried out care-
lessly or if an unforeseen accident occurs - can be just as damaging to
the welfare and interests of other states as an incident involving nuclear
weapons.
The international legal system does possess the mechanism necessary
to control the utilization of nuclear weapons in order to protect the
world's ecology. According to Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, rules of international law are created primarily by
custom, international agreements, and general principles of law.100 Those
sources that are generally considered secondary include judicial decisions
and scholarly writings.10' To this list can be added resolutions and decla-
rations of international organizations such as the United Nations. 2 It is
within this framework that international law traditionally functions to
regulate the actions of states.
International law creates binding rules in areas such as the environ-
mental effects of the production of nuclear arms, and likewise the produc-
tion of nuclear power, by first formulating arguments within terms of pre-
ventative and remedial actions. Through efforts at all interactive levels,
these practical responses can be shaped according to recognized legal
principles - such as those of international liability and state responsibil-
ity - and then adapted to the needs of the international environment.
Recent noteworthy examples of multilateral cooperation include the 1985
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 0 3 and the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.0 The
100. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38 (1), 59
Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993. Article 38 (1) provides:
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by . . . nations;
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules
of law.
This list of sources is considered authoritative. See BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 1979).
101. Id.
102. Formal statements of such international bodies as the U.N. General Assembly
have been relied upon by the I.C.J. See, e.g., Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 30-37 (Advi-
sory Opinion of Oct. 16). Debate over these instruments as sources of international law cen-
ters on whether lawmaking exceeds the authority granted by the U.N.Charter. See generally
Brownlie, supra note 100, at 695-98; Schachter, The Evolving Law of Development, 15
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-6 (1976).
103. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
104. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
reprinted in 52 FED. REG. 47515 (Dec. 16, 1987), and 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). For a discussion
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same is true with respect to the industrial and military use of the atom.
Conventions such as the Early Notification Convention and the Assis-
tance Convention'0 5 emphasize the willingness of governments to employ
practical measures according to the needs of the situation - especially in
time of an emergency. In this manner, the international community suc-
ceeds in at least laying the foundation for judging the amount of ecologi-
cal damage a state may legally inflict outside its own borders.
A. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
One of the most important provisions of international law regarding
liability for transboundary damage is contained in the statement issued in
1972 at a conference of 113 nations held in Stockholm, Sweden, com-
monly known as the "Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment."' 6 Most significant in the context of radioactive pollution are Prin-
ciples 21 and 22. In Principle 21, the Stockholm Declaration arguably
adopts the concept of strict liability, which the drafters then extended to
polluting activities and detrimental effects that occur beyond sovereign
territory. According to Principle 21,
[s]tates have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the-environment of other states or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.17
The standard of care adopted by Principle 21 reflects the legal rule ap-
plied by the arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter Decision discussed
above. 0 8 It is notable that this responsibility extends also to activities
under a state's "control," such as those carried out by or on ships regis-
tered under its flag and by its nationals - including operators of nuclear
power installations.
Principle 22 continues, requiring states to cooperate toward develop-
ing international environmental law and to promote these principles in
ways that insure injured victims are compensated. It tentatively recog-
nizes liability for transboundary ecological harm by providing that,
[s]tates shall co-operate to develop further the international law re-
garding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdic-
tion or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.'09
The extent that the Declaration represents a compromise is espe-
of these and other recent trends, see Nanda, supra note 50.
105. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
106. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 31.
107. Id. at 5; 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (emphasis added).
108. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
109. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 31; 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420.
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cially reflected in Principle 22. Its present form is substantially weakened
from that of an earlier proposal to require states to pay compensation for
all environmental damage caused by activities carried on within their ter-
ritory.1"' In the words of one analyst:
The earlier proposal failed because of concerns on the part of a num-
ber of delegates that it would have implied acceptance of a no-fault or
"strict" standard of liability in relation to environmental harm. These
delegates made clear that in their view liability to pay compensation
would only exist where there had been negligence attributable to the
State concerned. The relevance of fault in this connection remains
controversial."'
The major limitation of the Stockholm Declaration is that, even to-
day, almost twenty years after its acceptance, it has no direct legal signifi-
cance, nor does it purport to impose liability for transboundary environ-
mental harm. ' However, the precise terms of Principle 21 have received
considerable support from states. Following the Conference, the U.N.
General Assembly expressly recommended these Principles as laying
"down the basic rules governing" the international responsibility of states
regarding the environment. 1 3 Although the U.S.S.R. and a number of its
former satellites abstained from the vote and did not participate in the
Conference, '1 4 they have since supported the substance of Principle 21 in,
for example, Article 30 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States,"15 which provides: "All States have the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.""'
B. International Law Commission
The International Law Commission ("Commission" or "ILC"), which
is primarily responsible for "the progressive development of international
law and its codification, ' 1 7 carries out its mandate through preparatory
110. See LAW AND COMMUNICATION, supra note 34, at 134; Springer, supra note 36, at
134.
111. LAW AND COMMUNICATION, supra note 34, at 134, citing U.N. Doe. A/CONF.48/
PC.12 Annex 1 at 15 (1971).
112. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 45.
113. G.A. Res. 2996 (XXVII) International Responsibility of States in Regard to the
Environment, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, reprinted in LAW AND COMMUNICATION,
supra note 34, at 142. The Resolution received 112 votes in favor, zero against and 10
abstentions.
114. This fact was not due to disagreement with the principles of the Conference but
instead to the exclusion of East Germany as a result of the Conference's adopted criteria for
participation. See Sands, supra note 34, at 12-13.
115. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
116. Id. at art. 30. See Sands, supra note 34, at 12-13.
117. Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/4/Rev. 2
(1982). The U.N. Charter, article 13, paragraph 1, provides that the General Assembly "shall
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studies and reports on legal issues which may become the subject of mul-
tilateral treaties."18
The Commission is currently working on two divisible but similar
topics related to the present discussion. These are, first, the law of "state
responsibility"' 1 9 and, second, the principle of "international liability."'20
International liability, as a topic, derives from state responsibility. 2 , The
division between the two is based on the Commission's perception of two
types of national obligations existing under international law and the def-
inition assigned to each by the ILC and the standard practice of the Gen-
eral Assembly.'22
While both of these legal principles arguably apply to regulate coun-
tries' rights and liabilities for nuclear activities, because of their defini-
tions, international liability is most appropriate. The first, "primary" ob-
ligations, are defined as "rules imposing on States, in one or another
sector of inter-state relations, obligations the breach of which can be a
source of responsibility." Next, "secondary" obligations are those which
"purport to determine the legal consequences of failure to fulfill obliga-
tions established by the 'primary' rules.'" 23 In the Commission's view, the
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progres-
sive development of international law and its codification .. " The Assembly established
the ILC in 1947 for this purpose. See I. SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 5-8
(1987).
118. For a recent description of the Commission's work, see 1987 ILC Report, supra
note 41, at 89-115.
119. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-
Ninth Session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) (1977) [hereinafter Twenty-Ninth Session];
Second Report on State Responsibility, [1970] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1970/ADD.1; Report of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility to the Interna-
tional Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/152 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 227, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1 [hereinafter 1963 Subcommittee
Report].
120. The ILC has issued several reports concerning its work on this topic since it was
separated from that of state responsibility. See International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Preliminary Report by
R. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 and Adds. 1-2 (1980), re-
printed in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1, at 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/
Add.1 [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report]; International Liability for Inju-
rious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (2d Report by
R. Quentin-Baxter), [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1, at 103, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/
and Add. 1 & 2; International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law (3d Report by R. Quentin-Baxter), [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N pt. 1, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 and Corr. 1; International Liability for Injuri-
ous Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (4th Report by
R. Quentin-Baxter), [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1, at 201, U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/373 and
Corr. 1 & 2 [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter, 4th Report]; and 1987 ILC Report, supra note 41.
121. See Magraw, supra note 41, at 306-7 and sources cited.
122. See Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 253-56. See also id.;
McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law Commission Relating to Transfrontier En-
vironmental Harm, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 716-17 (1988).
123. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 31 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (no. 10) at 165, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
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concept of state responsibility deals only with secondary rules, those for
internationally wrongful or prohibited acts or omissions, while interna-
tional liability is concerned with primary rules, or rules involving "liabil-
ity for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by inter-
national law.'
24
International liability became a separate subject of study in 1978 af-
ter the ILC, at the request of the General Assembly, established a work-
ing group to consider the subject and later appointed R. Quentin-Baxter
as special rapporteur. 1 5 He produced five reports on the subject of inter-
national liability before his death in 1984.126 The work of Quentin-Baxter
and the Commission is based on the principle discussed earlier,'2 7 sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which recognizes that the right of states
to freely engage in and regulate activities within their borders is bounded
by the corresponding duty to respect and not harm the freedoms and in-
terests of other states.129 In the words of one commentator, it "would
seem appropriate" to consider strict liability as the applicable standard:
"[T]he Liability topic covers the question of liability without fault for
injurious transfrontier consequences of inherently dangerous but lawful
activities."' 2 9 Other commentators have inferred a clear standard of strict
liability within the work of the ILC.130
One of the most significant achievements of the ILC on this topic is
the Schematic Outline produced by Quentin-Baxter and contained as an
Annex to his Fourth Report in 1983.13' It contains the ILC primary obli-
gations, and covers the prevention and minimization of transboundary
harm and the provision for reparation. Section 5, Article 3 of the Sche-
matic Outline provides in part that "an innocent victim should not be left
to bear his loss or injury .... " The document also states:
Reparation shall be made by the acting State to the affected State in
respect of any such loss or injury, unless it is established that the
making of reparation for a loss or injury of that kind or character is
COMM'N, pt. 2, at 1, 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1976/Add. 1. See also Quentin- Baxter's
Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 253-56; Magraw, supra note 41, at 306-7.
124. See id.
125. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 33
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, pt. 2, at 6, 150, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/ Add.1. The ILC began work on
"state responsibility" as a general subject of study in 1963 (as opposed to responsibility only
for injuries to aliens). See 1963 Subcommittee Report, supra note 119, at 228; Magraw,
supra note 41, at 306.
126. See supra, note 120; International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (R. Quentin-Baxter's 5th Report), U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/383 and Add.1 (1984).
127. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
128. See Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 256-65.
129. McCaffrey, supra note 122, at 719.
130. See Handl, supra note 29, at 239-40 and authorities cited.
131. Quentin-Baxter's 4th Report, supra note 120, at 223, Annex.
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not in accordance with the shared expectations of those States."'3
The ILC remains deadlocked on key issues of definition and scope in
its efforts to define substantive standards for state liability.133 Although
the Commission may not soon reach agreement, there is no doubt that its
work thus far has at least focused attention on the need to address the
liability issue at the international level. In addition, the extensive record
compiled by the ILC has assisted other international bodies, such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency.' 3
C. The International Atomic Energy Agency
Since 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
been instrumental in formulating and implementing international stan-
dards for the safe and secure use of nuclear power. An organ of the
United Nations, the IAEA actively participates both in the regulation and
development of peaceful nuclear energy as well as in efforts to assist arms
reduction and to control nuclear proliferation.' 35 Under the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty"3 ' the Agency serves a dual role in the context of radiological
accidents: that of gathering, processing and disseminating information
and providing actual emergency response services following an
accident.
137
Like other international organizations involved in managing nuclear
energy, 38 the IAEA does not possess, as part of its delegated authority,
direct responsibility for regulating and enforcing nuclear safety standards
in the event of a nuclear accident. States maintain this authority exclu-
sively. However, if we consider
the control of nuclear accidents in the broad sense to encompass pre-
vention and management, then international co-operation, even if it
does not necessarily result in regulatory measures, does have a signifi-
cant role to play. This is true especially as concerns such issues as
immediate notification of radioactivity releases, mutual assistance,
compensation for damage and the strengthening of safety
standards. 39
Moreover, the Agency's role of developing and applying standards encom-
132. Id. at 224, § 4.2.
133. See McCaffrey, supra note 122, at 716-17.
134. See Sands, supra note 34, at 30-33 (discussing both the ILC and IAEA).
135. For a thorough discussion focused primarily on the IAEA's role in regulating and
stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, see L. SCHEINMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR ORDER (1988).
136. NPT, supra note 2.
137. See Handl, supra note 29, at 220.
138. Other than the IAEA, international nuclear regulatory agencies include the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). For an analysis of the role of the IAEA
and NEA in the role of a nuclear accident, see Reyners & Lellouche, supra note 39.
139. Id. at 3.
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passes three distinct areas of operation in the field of nuclear energy: the
Agency's own operations, for which the standards apply automatically;
national operations conducted with IAEA assistance or association which
apply the standards through agreements with the Agency; and situations
where the standards serve as examples or guidelines for national regula-
tory authorities.I 0 In addition, the broad international respect enjoyed by
the Agency increases the importance attributed by governments to its
views and policies. Thus, under limited circumstances, the IAEA can as-
sume more than an advisory position.
The IAEA was especially active in the aftermath of Chernobyl. It
helped governments obtain information concerning contamination levels
and in evaluating health risks. The organization also helped prepare stud-
ies and reports on the radiological consequences of the accident, while
extensively reviewing its causes and overall effects."" Specifically, the
IAEA Board of Governors convened a Post-Accident Review Meeting at-
tended by some 600 technical experts from countries and international
organizations around the world.
This effort culminated in September, 1986, when the IAEA adopted
by consensus the Early Notification Convention" 2 and the Assistance
Convention,"13 two integrated conventions aimed at coordinating mitiga-
tion of future nuclear accidents. The passage and ongoing implementa-
tion of these two conventions was rapid and, by most accounts, highly
efficient. They assist in the development of a framework for internation-
ally coordinated management of nuclear accidents. They also expressly
assign major new responsibilities to the IAEA." These qualities further
the recognition and position of the IAEA in addition to achieving a
greater level of international security in all nuclear materials operations.
Yet, the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions are also open
to criticism. For one, they "are disappointing in their failure to settle
clearly the international rights and obligations of states."" 5 In this re-
spect, the two recent conventions, by themselves, do not directly focus
efforts to apportion liability for the release of nuclear material. Admit-
tedly, these conventions were not intended to do so; however, their pas-
sage as an international reaction to Chernobyl does highlight the absence
of an international convention or treaty addressing the question of state
liability.
The IAEA is also engaged in work directed specifically toward an in-
ternational convention on the issue of inter-state liability. As stated by
140. Id. at 4-6.
141. Id. at 10-12.
142. Early Notification Convention, supra note 86.
143. Assistance Convention, supra note 87.
144. See Handl, supra note 29, at 220 and authorities cited.
145. Id. at 218. For a critical review, Handl cites Zehetner, Grenzuberschreitende Hilfe
bei Storfallen und Unfallen, in FRIEDLICHE KERNENERGIENUTZUNG UND STAATSGRENZEN IN
MITTELEUROPA 118 (N. Pelzer ed. 1986).
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the Secretariat of IAEA in 1987, there is
a need to consider the broader question of international liability for
the injurious consequences of activities attributable to states in the
context of their relations inter se and hence to elaborate - in a new
multilateral instrument - the principle of international liability for
nuclear damage under the law of State responsibility concerning inter-
national claims against States."
The Secretariat concluded that "there seems to be no doctrinal obstacle
to the elaboration of special rules intended to regulate international lia-
bility for nuclear damage.'
1 7
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ILC, in its earliest work on the subject of state responsibility,
briefly considered the subject of ultrahazardous activities. As early as
1957, Padilla Nervo, an ILC member, pointed out that,
[aiccording to the traditional rule, the international responsibility of a
State was involved only when the damage caused resulted from acts or
omissions contrary to the international obligations of that State. In
other words - as was the case until recently in municipal law -
there could be no liability without fault or negligence. However, the
damage already caused, or which might be caused, to persons or prop-
erty on the territory of other States by the manufacture or experimen-
tal explosion of nuclear weapons sheds doubts on the advisability or
maintaining the traditional rule. According to the traditional concepts
of fault and negligence, it was not strictly possible to talk of violation
of international obligations when the weapons were exploded on the
territory of the State concerned or on the high seas, especially as
every conceivable precaution was undoubtedly taken to prevent dam-
age. On the other hand, it was difficult to accept the view that, when
such explosions caused damage to the persons or on the territory of
other States, no international responsibility, with the corresponding
duty of compensation, arose." 8
The idea that civil liability for harm caused by radiation to third
parties at the international level should be on a strict or absolute basis, as
opposed to a system based on fault or negligence, originated in the late
fifties and early sixties as the arms race between the superpowers acceler-
ated and as nuclear energy became an increasingly feasible alternative to
traditional power sources. It is almost universally agreed that no-fault lia-
bility is the only kind of liability adequate to confront the risk of inher-
ently dangerous activities such as the handling of nuclear materials.'49 In
146. Sands, supra note 34, at 31, quoting IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/509 at § 2.
147. Id.
148. [1957] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, at 156.
149. See Handl, supra note 29, at 237-42. The doctrine of strict liability was perhaps
first established in the well-known English case, Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex.
1865), rev'd L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Rylands stands "for the
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1960, the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nu-
clear Energy150 was passed,1 5' and in 1963 the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage was developed under the auspices of the
IAEA.'52 The texts of these Conventions provide a strong and enduring
statement of international law on this subject. They both establish strict
or objective liability as the standard for the operators of nuclear power
installations.1 53 Under this standard, an injured "person"' 54 does not need
to prove fault or negligence in order to receive compensation for damage,
although they do have to prove a causal link between the accident and
their damage. 5
It is noteworthy that these conventions impose liability solely on the
"operator" of a nuclear facility. No other person, e.g., suppliers, will be
held liable for nuclear damage even if they alone caused the damage.'
While it does help insure more legal certainty, channeling liability exclu-
sively on operators is a limitation of the conventions. Not only does it
permit otherwise culpable actors such as state regulators to avoid liabil-
ity, 57 it also tends to channel legal attention away from states and onto
private parties.158 As such this concept of "soft state liability" is a draw-
proposition that the defendant should be held liable when he damages another by carrying
out any unusual activity unduly dangerous in the light of the character of the surrounding
area." International Standards, supra note 50, at 1112. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 78 (5th ed. 1984).
150. Paris Convention, supra note 75. The Paris Convention has 14 Member States:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Great Britain,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. See Pelzer, supra note
84, at 97, 99.
151. The Paris Convention is supplemented by the Brussels Supplementary Convention
of January 31, 1963, revised January 28, 1964 and November 12, 1982 (not yet in force),
1041 U.N.T.S. 350 (1977), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963).
152. Vienna Convention, supra note 76. The Vienna Convention has 10 Member States:
Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cuba, Egypt, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Trinidad and To-
bago and Yugoslavia. See Pelzer, supra note 84, at 85.
153. Paris Convention, supra note 75, art. 3; Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art.
IV(1).
154. "Person" is defined in the Vienna Convention, at Art. 1 (a), to include "States."
Although the Paris Convention does not define person, it defines "nuclear incident" broadly
as "any occurrence or succession of occurrences having the same origin which causes dam-
age" arising out of substances having radioactive properties. Paris Convention, supra note
75, art. 1 (a)(i). Nevertheless, the context and scope of both conventions is on civil or pri-
vate liability and not that of states. See infra, notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
155. Paris Convention, supra, note 75, art. 3; Vienna Convention, supra note 76, at art.
II, 1.
156. Paris Convention, supra note 75, art. 6; Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. II,
5. The operator is excused from liability only if, the damage results from an act or omission
done with intent to cause damage in which case the individual causing the damage is liable,
or if it is expressly so provided by contract. Id., art. 6 (f); art. X.
157. See Pelzer, supra note 84, at 102, pointing out that the U.S., a leading nuclear
state and not a party to either convention, did not introduce the legal channeling into na-
tional law, "although the U.S. industry profits from this concept when exporting nuclear
devices to other States."
158. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 29, at 228-37. But see id. at 114, stating: "The best
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back to assigning full liability and to providing adequate reparation fol-
lowing a transboundary injury. In reality, it represents a private approach
to the problem of providing compensation. " Unfortunately, private rem-
edies are inadequate to provide relief on an international scale.' The
severe transboundary damage resulting from an intense release of radia-
tion such as Chernobyl makes this point especially forcefully. Even if the
Soviet Union were a party to either the Paris or the Vienna Convention,
which it is not, the monetary compensation limits contained therein were
greatly exceeded by the damage caused in even the early stages of the
Chernobyl explosion. 6 ' Only by imposing liability -directly on the source
state can the international community achieve a degree of assurance that
the victims of a transboundary nuclear accident will be compensated.
As they are presently written, the Paris and Vienna Conventions are
incapable of setting this type of an effective, internationally viable stan-
dard for liability or compensation. For some time, work has been under-
way to streamline and harmonize the two conventions, but these efforts
are aimed almost exclusively at improving the effectiveness of the instru-
ments' civil liability system and the level of cooperation among the joint
parties. Despite a more favorable attitude among certain elements of the
IAEA toward implementing a system of source state liability, the current
proposed revisions of the existing conventions retain the private
approach.
Allowing states to avoid directly compensating transboundary envi-
ronmental injuries resulting from activities within their respective bor-
ders inhibits promotion of the twin concepts of states' international lia-
bility for and responsibility to compensate such harm under the 1972
Stockholm Declaration and the legal principles it represents. The present
need could hardly be stronger for a comprehensive, legislative convention
and most effective remedy for the victim of a nuclear incident is to grant him or her an
internationally guaranteed and direct civil laws claim against the operator of the nuclear
installation." However, Pelzer continues: "It might be useful to supplement the civil law
regime by State liability regulations covering fields where civil liability leaves gaps. This
holds especially for compensation for damage to the environment." Id.
159. See Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Con-
sequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15
(Feb. 3, 1984) at 250-68.
160. See McCaffrey, supra note 122, at 726-30; International Standards, supra note 50,
at 1115.
161. For instance, Article 7 of the Paris Convention limits the operator's liability to 15
million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the International Monetary Fund, which the Con-
tracting Parties may increase or decrease by legislation, provided coverage for a greater
amount is available, and provided the lower amount is not less than five million SDRs. See
Art. 10. In 1963 the Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra, note 151, increased the
amount of liability to 120 million SDRs, which will rise to 300 million SDRs after the 1982
Protocol enters into force. See Pelzer, supra note 84, at 104-105. The Vienna Convention
contains no such limitation. Article V(1) provides for a minimum amount, not an upper
ceiling. It reads: "The liability of the operator may be limited by the Installation State to
not less than five million U.S. dollars for any one nuclear incident."
1990
114 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 19:1
to provide more effective prevention, mitigation and reparation measures
against the effects of transboundary nuclear accidents. To be effective,
such a regime must impose stict liability directly on states in order to
insure the most conscious effort toward prevention as well as the guaran-
tee of adequate compensation in the event of a transboundary accident.
In the wake of Chernobyl and the growing realization that global interde-
pendence extends beyond economic and political ties, the international
community has begun to take positive steps toward this goal. Of course,
major obstacles still need to be overcome, a task that, in the event of
another Chernobyl-type incident, could take too long.
One such obstacle is the need to settle on an appropriate standard of
liability. Strict liability of states is arguably a part of general interna-
tional law. Although states have traditionally resisted the idea of strict
liability, present-day conditions have effected a change of attitude, and
the principle appears to be gaining support among governments. The
time is ripe for the international community to codify this emerging stan-
dard in the form of a multilateral convention.
